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NOTE
A SCOUT IS FRIENDLY: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
THE STATE EFFORT TO END PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION
The eradication of invidious discrimination is a great ideal of
modern government, both federal and state.1 To achieve the goal
of equal treatment, states have enacted public accommodations
acts (PAA's) requiring groups2 that serve the public to serve the
public equally.3 These acts naturally involve state intrusion into a
private group's service and membership practices.
In recent years, the trend in state PAA's has been toward greater
coverage of both the basis of discrimination and the entities
reached.4 As a result, groups previously immune from integration
laws are now included within their scope, particularly in the area
of gender discrimination.5 In this era of aggressive private club in-
tegration, discriminatory groups are often faced with two choices:
change discriminatory policies or defend them in court.
1. "[Eliminating discrimination] plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest
order." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984); see Heart of Atlanta
Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245-46 (1964) (noting that the stated purpose of
the legislation that President Kennedy proposed in 1963, which culminated in the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was to promote the general welfare by eliminating discrimi-
nation in public places based on race, color, religion or national origin); see also Marshall,,
Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 68, 68-70 (1986); Note, Ex-
clusion and Access in Public Accommodations: First Amendment Limitations Upon State
Law, 16 PAc. L.J. 1047, 1047, 1050-56 (1985) (discussing the scope of state and federal public
accommodations laws, and describing the interest each level of government has in prevent-
ing discrimination).
2. For purposes of this Note, the words "group" and "club" are not terms of art and are
used interchangeably.
3. See generally Note, Discrimination in Access To Public Places: A Survey of State and
Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215 (1978).
4. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 3, at 245-72;
Private Clubs: Round Two at the High Court, Nat'l L. J., Mar. 30, 1987, at 1.
5. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Litigation, however, is becoming an increasingly unattractive op-
tion. Public opinion polls show little support for private clubs that
discriminate.' Influential trade organizations such as the American
Bar Association officially denounce the practice of private club dis-
crimination;' and past or present membership in such clubs has
become detrimental for federal judicial candidates before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee." Litigation can be cost prohibitive. Addi-
6. A Gallup Poll in August 1988 reported that 60% of Americans believe private clubs
should not be permitted to practice gender discrimination. The percentage of Americans
opposed to the right of clubs to discriminate on the basis of race or religion was 80%. L.A.
Times, Aug. 21, 1988, § 2, at 2, col. 5.
7. At its August 1988 annual convention in Toronto, the ABA passed a resolution urging
lawyers and law firms to cease membership in private clubs that practice gender and racial
discrimination. ABA Asks End to Use of Biased Clubs, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1988, at A3,
col. 3. Interestingly, Elizabeth Anderson Hishon, plaintiff in the landmark gender discrimi-
nation suit against the Atlanta law firm of King & Spaulding, was a featured speaker at the
convention. Griffin B. Bell, partner in King & Spaulding and target of criticism for his mem-
bership in discriminatory private clubs when President Carter nominated him for Attorney
General in 1976, served on the ethics panel at the convention. ABA Sets Its Sights on
Women; Bias Recognized, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 22, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
8. The Senate Judiciary Committee has increased its scrutiny of the club membership of
nominees. Some nominees to the federal bench choose not to resign from all-male clubs
unless the Committee requests it, preferring to enact change in those clubs from within.
Club Memberships: An Unresolved Issue for Judicial Nominees, Wash. Post, Aug. 8, 1988,
at All, col. 1 [hereinafter Club Memberships]. Other candidates experience "nomination-
day conversions" and resign from their all-male clubs. All- White Clubs and Judicial Nomi-
nees: A Question of Motive, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1988, at A19, col. 6. One such candidate for
the United States District Court in Manhattan told the Committee: "It occurred to me that
... female litigants and female attorneys.., should not be under the misperception that the
judge might discriminate." Club Memberships, supra, at All, col. 6. Other converts include
Supreme Court Justices Harry Blackmun, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy. High
Court Gives New Life to Exclusive Private Clubs, United Press Int'l, Wash. News, June 26,
1988.
Sudden enlightenment is easy to understand. Senator Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), who han-
dles judicial nominations for the Committee, has said that "[i]f it's an all-male club that is
certainly a business club ... I cannot see somebody being confirmed for a judgeship if they
insist they're going to stay in such a club because I think it sends absolutely the wrong
signal." Club Memberships, supra, at All, col. 3-4. Currently, the ABA is considering revi-
sions to the Code of Judicial Conduct, a guide for the Senate Judiciary Committee, to clar-
ify policy on private club membership for judges. Id. at All, col. 3.
Membership in clubs that discriminate on the basis of race or religion raises different
issues. Membership in such clubs constitutes an almost irrebuttable strike against a candi-
date, unredeemable by merely resigning on nomination. Perhaps for this reason, clubs that
discriminate against minorities or Jews are more difficult to identify. Unlike many all-male
clubs that proclaim their discriminatory policy in the bylaws, all-white clubs practice dis-
crimination without any "official" policy. All-White Clubs and Judicial Nominees: A Ques-
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tionally, the Supreme Court has heard and rejected the primary
constitutional defense to forced private club integration-freedom
of association-three times since 1984.9
Yet some private groups in America are constitutionally privi-
leged to practice membership selectivity based on gender or sexual
preference. Recently, many of these groups have been forced to re-
linquish that right unfairly. The Boy Scouts of America (BSA) is
one group that recently changed its membership policy in light of
local statutory challenges.
This Note examines the legal challenge to the BSA's exclusion-
ary practices. The Note demonstrates that, despite the constitu-
tional protections the Supreme Court has devised, a combination
of vague state antidiscrimination laws and litigious activists have
denied certain groups their legitimate right to exclude. First, the
Note explores the present doctrine of freedom of association, set-
ting forth three recent Supreme Court decisions on the issue. Sec-
ond, the Note examines briefly freedom of association's chief rival,
the state PAA's. Third, the Note demonstrates that some PAA's
force "legitimate" groups like the BSA to open their doors and
thereby lose their constitutionally protected character. Finally, the
Note suggests a solution to the problem: a more focused definition
of public accommodation.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Doctrinal History
Scholars agree that freedom of association is fraught with theo-
retical ambiguity, not only in its constitutional source but in its
scope and utility.10 The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed
tion of Motive, supra, at A19, col. 2; Club Membership Kills Virginia Nomination to U.S.
Bench, Wash. Post, July 29, 1988, at D1, col. 2.
9. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988); Board of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 36-84
and accompanying text.
10. For critical studies of the ambiguities of freedom of association, see Devins, The
Trouble with Jaycees, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 901, 905-08 (1985); Marshall, supra note 1, at 75-
77.
As commentators have pointed out, the word "association" does not appear in the Consti-
tution. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L.
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the right "to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
REV. 1878, 1887 (1984); Note, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Associa-
tion and Right to Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1191 [hereinafter Note, Private Social
Clubs]. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has used freedom of association as a corollary
liberty to safeguard an individual's rights to speech and petition when he exercises them in
a group. Comment, Roberts v. United States Jaycees and the Affirmation of State Author-
ity to Prohibit Sex Discrimination in Public Accommodations: Distinguishing "Private"
Activity, the Exercise of Expressive Association, and the Practice of Discrimination, 38
RUTGERS L. REV. 341, 352 (1986); see Linder, supra, at 1887; Raggi, An Independent Right
to Freedom of Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2-11 (1977); see also NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("[Flreedom to engage in association...
is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."); Note, Private Social Clubs, supra, at
1194 (associational freedom a necessary concomitant to expression of first amendment free-
doms). The first amendment, then, has been the primary source of freedom of association.
Comment, supra, at 352; see generally D. FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIA-
TION 1-5 (1963) (discussing the historical antecedents to the right of association).
Other commentators have described freedom of association as a product of privacy rights,
which themselves fall within the penumbra of the due process clause of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624,
624-29, 659-66 (1980); Linder, supra, at 1884-86; Sengstock & Sengstock, Discrimination: A
Constitutional Dilemma, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 59, 63-65 (1967); Note, Association, Pri-
vacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 460, 466
(1970) [hereinafter Note, Association, Privacy and the Private Club]. Associational free-
doms are also arguably part of the "unwritten Constitution," the presuppositions regarding
higher law that the constitutional framers simply assumed and later secured in the ninth
amendment. Barnett, Are Enumerated Constitutional Rights the Only Rights We Have?
The Case of Associational Freedom, 10 HARv. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 101, 102-104, 110-12 (1987).
But see Easterbrook, Implicit and Explicit Rights of Association, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 91, 98-99 (1987) ("These doctrines assume that the political and moral philosophy
underlying the Constitution is the Constitution. The text, from this perspective, is but an
imperfect expression of the governing political and moral premises." Id. at 95). See gener-
ally Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L.
REV. 149 (1928) (examining ancient "natural law" conceptions of the legitimacy of laws,
their interrelationship with social mores, and the impact of these concepts on the establish-
ment of the Constitution); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975) (asserting the credibility of constitutional interpretation that finds protected
rights that do not appear in the express language of the Constitution). Indeed, purported
sources of freedom of association include communitarian ideals, see Linder, supra, at 1881-
82; the political-moral writings of Locke, see Barnett, supra, at 103; and de Tocqueville, see
Devins, supra, at 905; Linder, supra, at 1901-02; Raggi, supra, at 11-12; Sengstock & Seng-
stock, supra, at 61-62; Note, Private Social Clubs, supra, at 1190-91. NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), is generally regarded as the first case in which the Su-
preme Court identified freedom of association as a constitutional right. Raggi, supra, at 2;
Note, Private Social Clubs, supra, at 1192. In Patterson, however, the Supreme Court de-
scribed freedom of association not as an independent right, but as a right necessary to se-
cure first amendment advocacy. 357 U.S. at 460-61.
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and ideas"11 thereby reducing association to a first amendment ad-
junct. Yet, some cases have hinted that freedom of association may
be an independent right.12 In Bell v. Maryland,1 3 for instance, Jus-
tice Goldberg characterized the right to choose one's associates as a
"protected liberty," framed in the language of a privacy right:
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the
constitutional right of every person to close his home or club to
any person or to choose his social intimates and business part-
ners solely on the basis of personal prejudices including race.
These and other rights pertaining to privacy and private associa-
tion are themselves constitutionally protected liberties.14
In Evans v. Newton, 5 Justice Douglas, equating association to a
form of protected expression, referred to:
the right of the individual to pick his own associates so as to
express his preferences and dislikes, and to fashion his private
life by joining such clubs and groups as he chooses.... A private
golf club ... restricted to either Negro or white membership is
one expression of freedom of association.16
Many commentators have also examined whether freedom of as-
sociation is an independent right. Although their arguments are
based more on philosophical yearnings and dicta than firm prece-
dent,17 several scholars have argued that such a right exists.
11. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Pat-
terson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
12. See Note, Private Social Clubs, supra note 10, at 1190-95.
13. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
14. Id. at 313 (Goldberg, J., concurring). For references to the Goldberg quotation, see
Linder, supra note 10, at 1886 n.49; Note, Association, Privacy and the Private Club, supra
note 10, at 465-66; Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Discriminatory Membership
Policy of a National Organization Held Not Protected By First Amendment Freedom of
Association, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1055 n.2 (1985).
15. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
16. Id. at 298-99. For references to the Evans quotation, see Sengstock & Sengstock,
supra note 10, at 65; Note, Association, Privacy and the Private Club, supra note 10, at
465.
17. Compare Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: What Price Freedom of Associa-
tion?, 1985 Dar. C.L. REV. 149, 150-53 ("[I]t is apparent that the Court has not recognized
freedom of association, either intimate or expressive, as an independent right." Id. at 152)
with Note, supra note 1, at 1067 ("Freedom of association ... is not necessarily relegated to
the position of a secondary right.... [Tihe right to associate has been regarded as a funda-
mental liberty, frequently described as one of the preferred rights of the first amendment."
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The counterpart of the right to associate-the right to ex-
clude's-also has historical roots.19 In Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis,20 Justice Douglas claimed that:
[t]he associational rights which our system honors permit all
white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed.
They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to
be established. Government may not tell a man or woman who
his or her associates must be. The individual can be as selective
as he desires.2"
However, Douglas' strong language never reflected reality.22 The
Court qualified the right to exclude in several respects.
First, the right to exclude was merely a rhetorical handmaiden
to the right to associate. Exclusion for its own sake was unpro-
tected.23 The exclusion had to be tied to a protected first amend-
(footnotes omitted)). For further comments on the constitutional status of freedom of asso-
ciation, see Devins, supra note 10, at 905-08; Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 91-92; Karst,
supra note 10, at 652-66; Marshall, supra note 1, at 77-91; Raggi, supra note 10, at 11-14;
Sengstock & Sengstock, supra note 10, at 63-65, 115-24; Note, Association, Privacy and the
Private Club, supra note 10, at 463-66.
18. Note, supra note 1, at 1067-75 ("Concurrent with the right to associate exists a right
not to associate, which includes the first amendment interest of an association in not being
forced to accept unwanted members." Id. at 1067.). See also Karst, supra note 10, at 637-38
(discussion of the right to exclude others from intimate relationships).
19. But see Note, Association, Privacy and the Private Club, supra note 10, at 464 ("At
no time has the Court as a whole addressed itself to the question of exclusive association.").
20. 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972).
21. Id. at 179-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Note, supra note 14, at 1055 n.2; Comment,
supra note 10. at 349, for references to the Moose Lodge quotation.
22. See Comment, supra note 10, at 354 ("Case law thus far seems to indicate that the
right of association simply does not include any right to discriminatorily exclude."); see also
Note, Private Social Clubs, supra note 10, at 1206-09 (discussing the right to exclude). But
see Marshall, supra note 1, at 68 ("[Aicts of discrimination may themselves be entitled to
constitutional protection.").
23. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976); Marshall, supra note 1, at 73, 79-80.
In Runyon, the Court drew a distinction between the advocacy of exclusionary beliefs and
the practice of exclusion, though it assumed that the practice of exclusion was not a part of
the advocacy. 427 U.S. at 175-76. For commentary on this distinction, see Marshall, supra
note 1, at 103-05; McGovern, Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte: Prying Open the Doors of the All-Male Club, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 117, 133 n.87
(1988); Comment, supra note 10, at 355-56. The Court, however, has decided to hear argu-
ments on whether Runyon should be reconsidered. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108
S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (per curiam).
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ment interest.24 As the Court in Norwood v. Harrison noted, "In-
vidious private discrimination .. has never been accorded
affirmative constitutional protections. "25
Second, whether recognized explicitly, the strength of the right
to exclude was only as strong as the strength of the first amend-
ment interest from which it derived. Groups granted the most pro-
tection from government intrusion were politically oriented, such
as the NAACP. Conversely, a nonpolitical group, such as a law
partnership, 26 possessed a weak claim to first amendment protec-
tion, and a correspondingly weak right to exclude.
Third, the Supreme Court always balanced countervailing inter-
ests against freedom of association.2 A state or federal interest
could defeat a group's freedom of association claim.29 Unlike free-
dom of association, which affirmatively protected gatherings from
government intrusion or disruption, the right to exclude did not
emerge as a true constitutional right. Exclusion was only an occa-
sionally necessary counterpart to freedom of association."0
24. See 427 U.S. at 175-77. Perhaps alternatively the exclusion must be tied to a privacy
right. For a discussion of the protection of exclusionary intimate ties, as opposed to the first
amendment protection, see Sengstock & Sengstock, supra note 10, at 64-65.
25. 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973). See Comment, supra note 10, at 353-56. But see supra notes
18-19 and accompanying text.
26. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
27. For support of these contentions, see, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 94-99. Eas-
terbrook criticizes what he calls the "malleability of claims based on 'association'" and the
ultimate result: "Association has constitutional protection whenever the legislature chooses
to leave it alone-which is say, it has none whenever the Court, speaking for 'society,' ap-
proves of the legislature's objectives." Id. at 696-97. Another author attributes the variable
protection afforded associational freedom not to the whim of the legislature, but to the "hi-
erarchy" of first amendment rights, with political speech at the highest rung. If the purpose
of the association is political, it is granted a similarly high constitutional protection. McGov-
ern, supra note 23, at 136.
28. For commentary, see, e.g., Marshall, supra note 1, at 77; Rumsey, Legal Aspects of
the Relationship Between Fraternities and Public Institutions of Higher Education: Free-
dom of Association and Ability to Prohibit Campus Presence or Student Membership, 11
J.C. & U.L. 465, 471-72 (1985); Note, Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs, 29 HASTINGS L.J.
417, 422-23 (1977).
29. Note, supra note 28, at 422-23.
30. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 75-76; McGovern, supra note 23, at 133.
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Recent Developments
The competing values of associational freedom and equal access
created a dilemma for the Supreme Court from the beginning."
William Marshall wrote that the conflict "involves the two virtual
first principles of contemporary constitutional law: freedom and
equality. The right to choose one's associates (freedom) is pitted
against the right to equal treatment (equality)." 2 Choosing one
might result in the unfair denial of goods and services to an arbi-
trarily excluded group. Choosing the other could trample the legiti-
mate first amendment rights of the excluding groups. Professor
Laurence Tribe noted that the clash is even more complex. 3 The
rights of the individual group member are implicated in freedom of
association because the individual has a first amendment interest
in choosing with whom to engage in protected activity. Likewise,
an abridgement of an individual's freedom to associate exists
whenever that person is denied access to an organization. "
In the effort to reconcile these values, the Supreme Court has
tread lightly. In the three cases that dealt squarely with the an-
tidiscrimination/freedom of association issue, the Court employed
a fact-specific analysis.3 5
Roberts v. United States Jaycees
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,'3 the all-male Jaycees
brought suit against the State of Minnesota, claiming that the
state public accommodation act violated first amendment and as-
sociational rights. The Minnesota PAA forbade sex discrimination
in a place of public accommodation, 7 forcing the local Jaycees
31. See Linder, supra note 10, at 1880-84 (discussing how the Court addressed the ten-
sion between associational freedom and equality in Roberts v. United States Jaycees). How-
ever, the Court sometimes employs intellectual artifice to obscure the degree of tension.
Marshall, supra note 1, at 102-03.
32. Marshall, supra note 1, at 69.
33. Laurence Tribe's treatment of the "dual character" of freedom of association may
explain the Court's reticence in formulating a per se rule. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW §§ 15-17 (2d ed. 1988). See also Marshall, supra note 1, at 69-71; Note, Private
Social Clubs, supra note 10, at 1208.
34. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, §§ 15-17.
35. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
36. 468 U.S. 609, 615 (1984).
37. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, subd. 3 (West Supp. 1988-1989).
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chapter to admit women as members."8 The Supreme Court held
that by forcing the Jaycees to admit women members, the PAA did
not violate freedom of association."9
The Jaycees case was a landmark opinion.40 For the first time,
the Court devised a balancing test 1 to determine whether antidis-
crimination legislation infringes on an organization's associational
freedoms. The Jaycees test consisted of two distinct prongs:
(1) freedom of intimate association and (2) freedom of expressive
association.42 Either prong may be used separately to prevail in a
claim of freedom of association. 43 The Jaycees failed both prongs
of the test.
Freedom of intimate association, the first prong of the test, pro-
tects the right to privacy of certain groups. Without reference to
any one amendment, the Court explained that "because the Bill of
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the
formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal re-
lationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified in-
terference by the State."'44 A long list of cases protecting the right
to privacy followed:45 cases that protected freedoms "central to any
concept of liberty. '46 Gatherings protected by the freedom of inti-
mate association related to the family: marriage,47 childbirth,48
child rearing and education,'49 and cohabitation with relatives. 0
38. 468 U.S. at 614-17.
39. Id. at 621, 628-29. Justice Brennan authored the opinion, joined by Justices White,
Marshall, Powell, and Stevens. Justice O'Connor joined in parts I and III of the opinion,
and filed a separate concurrence. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision.
40. Linder, supra note 10, at 1878.
41. The balancing test apparently applies to the expressive association prong. See infra
text accompanying notes 63-70.
42. 468 U.S. at 617-18.
43. Id. at 618 ("We ... find it useful to consider separately the effect of applying the
Minnesota statute to the Jaycees on what could be called its members' freedom of intimate
association and their freedom of expressive association.").
44. Id.
45. The list included Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Jaycees, 468 U.S. at
618-19.
46. 468 U.S. at 619.
47. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
48. Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
49. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
50. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
19891
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The Court noted that the right of intimate association "presup-
poses deep attachments."'I Determining the extent to which inti-
mate association protects an organization "unavoidably entails a
careful assessment of where that relationship's objective character-
istics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most
attenuated of personal attachments. ' 52 In determining whether an
association should be protected, the Court considered "size, pur-
pose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics
that in a particular case may be pertinent."53
The Jaycees failed to qualify for protection under freedom of in-
timate association. The two local chapters were neither small nor
selective. The memberships hovered around 400 members each,
and neither chapter had ever denied a male membership in the
club. Moreover, women and other nonmembers were already in-
cluded in many Jaycees activities.
5 4
The second prong of the test focuses on the freedom of expres-
sive association. The Supreme Court recognized this second area of
protection for associations that gather in the pursuit of "political,
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends."55 The
Court noted the danger to expressive freedom that antidiscrimina-
tion laws can impose: "There can be no clearer example of an in-
trusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than
a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire.... Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a
freedom not to associate. 56 To protect this interest, the Court de-
vised a nexus requirement: the right of expressive association
would be abridged if the group's message or purpose was diluted or
altered by the forced inclusion of another group. 57 For example, a
state could not force a white supremacist organization to admit
black members.5 8 Similarly, a state could not force an all-male as-
51. 468 U.S. at 619-20.
52. Id.
53. Id. For criticism of these standards, see Marshall, supra note 1, at 81-83.
54. 468 U.S. at 621.
55. Id. at 622.
56. Id. at 623.
57. Id. at 626-28.
58. For a discussion of this possibility, see Devins, supra note 10, at 911-13; Marshall,
supra note 1, at 104.
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sociation devoted to the rejection of the equal rights amendment
to admit women. 9
The Supreme Court held that the associational purpose of the
Jaycees was predominantly humanitarian and professional in na-
ture.6 0 Although arguably protected by the first amendment, the
purpose was only minimally tied to gender exclusivity.6 The
forced inclusion of women by the Minnesota PAA, therefore, would
have no significant deleterious effect on the Jaycees' constitution-
ally protected purpose.2
In assessing the infringement on expressive association that the
forced inclusion of women might cause, the Supreme Court bal-
anced that infringement against the state's compelling interest in
preventing discrimination.6 3 According to the Court, freedom of ex-
pressive association is not absolute. 4 The Court explained that
"[i]nfringements [on expressive association] ... may be justified by
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated
to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. '65 The Court
said that state PAA's "plainly serv[e] compelling state interests of
the highest order," eradicating invidious discrimination and assur-
ing women equal access to goods and services.66
Conversely the Jaycees failed to prove that the inclusion of
women "impose[d] any serious burdens" on the Jaycees' constitu-
tionally protected freedom of expressive association. Even if an
"incidental abridgement" did occur, Minnesota's interest in pro-
viding women with business contacts and leadership skills, 8 which
59. For a discussion of this possibility, see Devins, supra note 10, at 913-14; Linder, supra
note 10, at 1892; McGovern, supra note 23, at 138 nn.103-04.
60. 468 U.S. at 626-28.
61. Id.
62. Id. Of course, the implication is that some deleterious effect is allowed.
63. Id. at 628.
64. Id. at 623.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 624. This statement is the first time the Court called the elimination of invidi-
ous gender discrimination a compelling state interest. Note, Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, supra note 14, at 1080.
67. 468 U.S. at 626.
68. Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the Minnesota court that business contacts and
leadership skills are legitimate goods and services. Id.
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the Jaycees offered, outweighed that harm. 9 Moreover, enforce-
ment of the PAA was the least restrictive means available to
Minnesota.7 0
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte
The second Supreme Court case to address the conflict between
antidiscrimination legislation and freedom of association was
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Du-
arte. 1 Rotary is notable for three reasons. 2 First, the Court as-
serted that Jaycees "provides the framework for analyzing appel-
lants' constitutional claims. '73 Second, the Court specifically
denied having restricted the freedom of intimate association to
family relationships. 74
Finally, in a footnote,7 5 the Court clarified language in Jaycees
that contrasted the Kiwanis with the Jaycees.76 Scholars and liti-
gants had interpreted the Jaycees language as implying that the
Kiwanis might deserve constitutional protection under intimate as-
69. Id. at 628.
70. Id. at 628-29.
71. 481 U.S. 537 (1987). Justice Powell wrote the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor took no part in the decision.
Rotary involved a local Rotary Club that had sued Rotary International in California
state court after the local club lost its charter for admitting women members. Rotary Inter-
national won on the trial court level based on statutory construction of California's PAA,
the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1982). The California Court of Ap-
peals reversed, and Rotary International appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 481
U.S. at 542-44. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding
that the application of the California PAA did not violate Rotary International's right to
freedom of private or expressive association. Id. at 544-49.
72. For a contrasting view on the impact of Rotary on freedom of association, see Note,
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte: Redefining Associa-
tional Rights, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 141.
73. 481 U.S. at 544.
74. Id. at 545. See McGovern, supra note 23, at 134; Note, Rotary International v. Du-
arte: Limiting Associational Rights to Protect Equal Access to California Business Estab-
lishments, 19 PAC. L.J. 399, 421-22 (1988). But see Note, supra note 72, at 152-53.
75. 481 U.S. at 547 n.6.
76. In disposing of the Jaycees' argument that the Minnesota Human Rights Act was
unconstitutionally overbroad, the Court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in con-
struing the Act, refused to analogize the Jaycees to other private organizations like the
Kiwanis. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 630-31 (1984).
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sociation.17 The Court, however, reaffirmed the fact-specific nature
of the freedom of association analysis and declined to speculate on
the extent to which the first amendment protects the associational
rights of organizations other than the Rotary Clubs. As Justice
Powell noted, "Whether the 'zone of privacy' established by the
First Amendment extends to a particular club or entity requires a
careful inquiry into the objective characteristics of the particular
relationships at issue. '78
New York State Club Association v. City of New York
The Court decided New York State Club Association v. City of
New York 9 just one year after Rotary. Commentators anticipated
that the case would delineate more clearly the boundaries of the
constitutional rights afforded to smaller private clubs.80 The case
involved a constitutional challenge to New York City's PAA.81 The
Court examined the law on its face, with freedom of association
playing a small role in the inquiry. The Court rejected the chal-
lenge quickly, noting that the record before the Court "contain[ed]
no specific evidence on the characteristics of any club covered by
77. See Private Clubs: Round Two at the High Court, supra note 4, at 30.
78. Id. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 69, for comment on the fact-specific nature of the
freedom of association inquiry.
79. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988). All nine Justices joined parts I, II, and III of the opinion.
Justice Scalia did not join part IV, which analyzed the equal protection challenge to the
exemption to the New York City PAA. He filed a separate opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. Justice O'Connor also filed a separate concurring opinion, in
which Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 2237.
In 1984 New York City amended its PAA for the purpose of prohibiting discrimination in
private clubs that exhibit certain indicia of public accommodations. The amendment to Lo-
cal Law 63 extended the PAA to clubs with more than 400 members that provide regular
meal service and regularly allow nonmembers to pay for use of the facilities. Id. at 2228
(citing NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)).
80. One commentator predicted:
This case gives the Court the opportunity to clarify its two previous rulings
on the delicate balance between state efforts to eliminate discrimination
against citizens and the individual citizen's protected freedom to associate and
exclude. The previous cases have avoided many of the difficult issues because
of the extreme size of the organizations involved. The crucial issue here is
whether small, private clubs of exclusive membership require a different
analysis.
James, Do Private Clubs Have a Right to Exclude?, 9 PREviEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT CASES 253, Feb. 26, 1988.
81. 108 S. Ct. at 2230.
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the Law."8' The Court assumed that not all of the clubs covered by
the PAA would be constitutionally protected.8 Additionally, the
Court refused to find that the statute violated the constitutional
rights of "any club, let alone a substantial number of them. '8 4
The framing of the cause of action as a facial challenge enabled
the Supreme Court to avoid applying freedom of association to pri-
vate groups more intimate or expressive than the Jaycees or Ro-
tary Clubs. Despite two later decisions, the Jaycees test remains
the only useful constitutional reference point in the conflict be-
tween freedom of association and state equal access laws.
MODERN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION
Historically, state rather than federal public accommodation acts
have been the most effective tool to fight discrimination.85 States
initially enacted such acts to fill the gap created when the Court in
1882 struck down the first federal PAA in the Civil Rights cases.8
82. Id. at 2234.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2235.
85. Note, supra note 3, at 287; Note, supra note 1, at 1050.
The modern federal PAA applicable to private entities is Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Congress enacted this law pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment and article I, § 8, which granted Congress plenary power to regulate
interstate commerce. Note, supra note 3, at 219-20. Title II prohibits discrimination or seg-
regation on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)(a); dis-
crimination based on gender, however, is not prohibited. See id. The purpose of the statute
was to end invidious discrimination, particularly that based on race. Note, supra note 3, at
224. The reach of Title II to places of public accommodation has been extremely broad. See,
e.g., Brown v. Loudoun Golf and Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1983) (golf
club); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports and Exposi-
tion Auth., 532 F. Supp. 1088 (N.J. 1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1982) (sports sta-
dium). Essentially, any organization that can possibly have an effect on interstate commerce
is within the reach of the statute. Note, supra note 3, at 221-23. An exemption to Title II
exists, however: "private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public." 42
U.S.C. § 2000(a)(e). To prevent use of the "private club" designation as a shield against
enforcement of the antidiscrimination mandate, courts have construed the private club ex-
emption narrowly. Note, supra note 3, at 223.
For an informative, if pointed, summary of private club exemption cases, see Burns, The
Exclusion of Women From Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of
Full Equality, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 377-84 (1983); see also Note, Private Social
Clubs, supra note 10, at 1181-82; Note, supra note 28, at 436-37; Comment, supra note 10,
at 351.
86. Note, supra note 3, at 238-40.
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Even with today's expansive interpretation of the commerce
clause, Congress has been loath to extend the federal PAA beyond
racial discrimination. 87 Moreover, the federal law generally is lim-
ited in application to traditional places of public accommodation,
such as restaurants and hotels.8 Commentators have speculated
that federalism and a reluctance to intrude into traditional areas of
state competence underlies this hesitancy by Congress to expand
the scope and reach of the federal PAA. 89
State PAA's are often broader than the federal PAA in the types
of discrimination prohibited.90 In addition to prohibiting discrimi-
nation based on race, creed, color, religion, and national origin,
state PAA's often include prohibitions against discrimination on
the basis of sex,91 handicap, 92 marital status,93 age,e4 sexual orien-
tation,91 personal appearance,96 and class2 7
Any recent broadening of the types of discrimination prohibited
in the PAA's has not spurred significantly the integration of previ-
ously exclusionary groups; most of the discrimination at issue in-
volves gender. In recent years, courts have achieved the integration
of private clubs by broadening the meaning of "place of public ac-
87. Note, supra note 1, at 1052; see also Burns, supra note 85, at 375-76.
88. Note, supra note 1, at 1052; see also Burns, supra note 85, at 375.
89. Note, supra note 1, at 1052.
90. Note, supra note 3, at 260-61; see also Note, supra note 1, at 1052-53.
91. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 1986); IDAHO CODE § 18-7301 (1987);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-501 (1985).
92. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501
(1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-23 (1987).
93. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501
(1987); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney 1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (1987).
94. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501
(1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-501 (1985).
95. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 note on sexual preference (West Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-2501 (1987); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296 note on sexual preference (McKinney Supp.
1989).
96. The District of Columbia prohibits discrimination based on personal appearance. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1987).
97. Massachusetts includes this category. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98
(West Supp. 1988).
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commodation." Many clubs that were outside the definition of
PAA are now characterized as a place of public accommodation."
The definition of what constitutes a place of public -accommoda-
tion is unsettled. 9 Limits the United States Supreme Court im-
posed on that definition have been based on statutory construc-
tion, not constitutional interpretation. 00 Consequently, states may
adopt a broader definition of places of public accommodation than
that of Title IH.101 Each state may, for the most part, adopt its own
definition of place of public accommodation.10 2 The Constitution
does not mandate a private club exemption, and fewer than half
the states exempt private clubs from their PAA.103 An organization
may be "public" for the purposes of the PAA of one state and "pri-
vate" for the purposes of the PAA in another state.104
The statutory construction placed on a state PAA is subject to
several variables. State courts rely heavily on the legislative intent
behind the enactment of the PAA to determine its application.0 5
State judges, however, can be sure of neither the legislative motive
behind the definition of the phrase "place of public accommoda-
tion"0 nor the ultimate goals of the antidiscrimination mea-
98. See Linder, supra note 10, at 1881; McGovern, supra note 23, at 123; Note, Private
Social Clubs, supra note 10, at 1181-82; Note, supra note 3, at 240-43; Note, supra note 1,
at 1047-48.
99. State decisions often turn on this issue. In Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of
America, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, the Commission ruled
that for purposes of the Connecticut PAA, the BSA was a "place of public accommodation."
204 Conn. 287, 295, 528 A.2d 352, 357 (1987). The Connecticut Superior Court overturned
this statutory construction on appeal. Id. at 291-92, 528 A.2d at 355. Finally, the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court upheld the trial court decision, but applied a different construction to
the PAA. Id. at 298, 528 A.2d at 358. See also Note, supra note 3, at 240.
100. Note, supra note 3, at 240. See also Note, supra note 1, at 1053.
101. McGovern, supra note 23, at 122-23; Note, supra note 14, at 1070 n.104; Note, supra
note 3, at 240; Note, supra note 1, at 1052-53.
102. Note, supra note 3, at 240-42; Note, supra note 1, at 1052-56.
103. Note, supra note 3, at 250-51. But cf. Note, Private Social Clubs, supra note 10, at
1181-82 (as of 1970 all states with PAA's had explicitly or tacitly exempted private clubs).
104. Compare Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of America, 275 Or. 327, 551 P.2d 465 (1976) (BSA
held "private" under Oregon's PAA) with Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of
America, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205
(1984) (BSA held "public" under California's PAA). For a further discussion of inconsisten-
cies among state PAA's, see Note, supra note 3, at 250-52.
105. Note, Public Accommodation Statutes: Is Ladies' Night Out?, 37 MERCER L. REy.
1605, 1616-19 (1986).
106. See supra note 99.
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sure. 107 For example, some PAA's begin with a legislative state-
ment of purpose, making the judiciary's job relatively simple; other
PAA's are silent as to intended scope and purpose, relying on case
law to fill in the blanks. 10 8
A second variable in the statutory interpretation of PAA's is the
"compound structure" of some state statutes. 109 One commentator
has argued that if a legislature drafts a PAA as all-inclusive, cover-
ing employment and housing discrimination along with public ac-
commodation discrimination, the state judiciary will place a "slid-
ing scale of importance" on possible violations regardless of the
legislative intent.110 As a consequence, judges in states with com-
pound discrimination statutes will be less likely to find PAA viola-
tions than will judges in states that have separate public accommo-
dation, housing, and employment laws."1
The final variable in construction of state PAA's is the presence
or absence of express language defining various terms.1 Like an
express statement of purpose, express definitions of terms relieve a
judge of second-guessing statutory meaning and provide uniform-
ity of decision making within a state. 3 Even with express defini-
tions, however, state judges may ignore the definitional language
and use their own methodology of construction.1 4
The precision with which a legislature defines "place of public
accommodation" determines the scope of an antidiscrimination
statute.115 The most precise definition is an exact listing of places
where discrimination is prohibited. 6 The least precise definition
is the "general definition,"1 17 which prohibits discrimination in "all
107. Note, supra note 105, at 1616-17.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1618. For a general discussion of the drafting of state PAA's, see Note, supra
note 3, at 240-43.
110. Note, supra note 105, at 1618.
111. This result follows because "[t]he importance of a male not being able to buy a
drink, attend a basketball game, or get his car washed for the same price as a female pales
in comparison to someone not being able to obtain housing or employment because of his or
her race or sex." Id.
112. Id. at 1618-20.
113. Id. at 1618.
114. Id. at 1618-20.
115. Note, supra note 3, at 241-43.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 242.
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business establishments of every kind whatsoever.""'  The advan-
tage of the general definition is that courts have more leeway to
interpret the inclusiveness of the definition. The disadvantage is
that the general definition is vague and cannot adequately alert
either the exclusive association or the excluded party of the poten-
tial success of a challenge under the PAA. 119
In the months following the Club Association decision, states
and municipalities nationwide have embarked on an activist effort
to integrate single sex private groups. Municipalities and states
that are considering antidiscrimination measures aimed at private
clubs or that already have instituted such measures in the wake of
Club Association include: Annapolis, Boise, Reno, Buffalo, Chi-
cago, Detroit, St. Louis, Washington, D.C., Boston, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, Sacramento, California, Ohio, and Kentucky. 20
Race is generally no longer an overt barrier to private club mem-
bership;' 2' therefore, most of the new ordinances are directed at
all-male clubs. In addition to direct bans on discriminatory poli-
cies, an indirect form of leverage that many governments use is the
threat of revocation of a private club's liquor and food license.122
Cities or municipalities issue liquor licenses according to local
rules; and the licenses represent a strong bargaining chip.'23
The authority of the states and cities to enforce their PAA's is
grounded in the legitimate exercise of reserved police power, 124 jus-
118. See, e.g., Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
119. Note, supra note 3, at 243. The author advocates a middle ground position: a list
with qualifying language not limiting the definition to the items on the list. This approach
"offers both flexibility and guidance." Id.
120. Boise to consider ban on private club bias, U.P.I. Regional News, Sept. 19, 1988;
Club Votes to Allow Women, U.P.I. Domestic News, Sept. 16, 1988; State Senate Passes
Bill That Targets Bias in Private Clubs, L.A. Times, Aug. 13, 1988 at 1-24, col. 1; Nevada
Newsbriefs, U.P.I. Regional News, June 30, 1988; Rights panel wants private clubs open to
all in Kentucky, U.P.I. Regional News, June 29, 1988; Group wants Ohio lawmakers to
guarantee women's rights to join clubs, U.P.I. Regional News, June 23, 1988; Some Mourn
End To All-Male Bastions; Cities Hail Ruling, A.P. Domestic News, June 21, 1988.
121. See supra note 8.
122. See, e.g., State Senate Passes Bill That Targets Bias in Private Clubs, supra note
120, at 1-24, col. 1. Loss of state funding may also be used as leverage. Note, Rotary Interna-
tional v. Duarte, supra note 74, at 410-11. For general discussions of various leverage devices
that can be used to integrate private clubs, see Burns, supra note 85, at 398-406; Note,
supra note 28, at 444-49; Note, supra note 3, at 272-86.
123. Burns, supra note 85, at 398-99.
124. Note, supra note 1, at 1053.
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tified by the compelling state interest in eradicating arbitrary and
invidious discrimination. 2 5 Like the freedom of association, how-
ever, the police power of state governments is not absolute. The
Jaycees test limits the power of federal and state governments to
integrate an organization. 126 The problem lies in identifying the
groups that may legitimately seek protection under the umbrella of
freedom of association.
THE PROBLEM
Until recently, the balance of power between antidiscrimination
laws and discriminatory private clubs weighed heavily in favor of
the clubs. Today the situation has changed, and the balance of
power has shifted to the side of the excluded.12 7 Through a combi-
nation of vaguely drafted PAA's and overzealous integration strat-
egies, many private clubs are forced to change their membership
practices even though they are arguably protected by the Jaycees
test.
The strategy used to integrate the Woman's National Demo-
cratic Club in Washington, D.C., is an example. Based on Wash-
ington's antidiscrimination law, activists threatened to file suit
against the Woman's National Democratic Club and two other all-
female private clubs. Rather than bear the costs of litigation, the
Woman's National Democratic Club agreed to allow men to be-
come full voting members. The Young Women's Christian Associa-
tion (YWCA) faces similar pressure nationwide. 2 '
125. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 40-70 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 1, at 1053.
127. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text; and Note, supra note 1, at 1047-48.
See also Ruling Is Greeted With Praise from Women and Silence from Clubs, N.Y. Times,
June 21, 1988, at A19, col. 1; Club Doors Are Open, But Women Draw Back, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 14, 1988, at C1, col. 5.
128. The threat of litigation works to extort clubs into changing their membership prac-
tices for two reasons: first, the cost of litigation and second, the possibility of losing. Very
few clubs can afford to litigate through the appellate level. In addition, the party seeking to
integrate often seeks attorneys fees. Finally, becoming embroiled in a bitter legal dispute
over the right to discriminate is not the sort of publicity most clubs desire. See Y.W.C.A.
Resists Admission of Men, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1988, at A22, col. 1; Private Club Review
Asked, Wash. Post, July 6, 1988, at B5, col. 2; Two women's clubs threatened with discrimi-
nation suit, U.P.I. Regional News, July 5, 1988; see also supra notes 6-8 and accompanying
text.
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The strategy of threatening to sue, or actually filing suit against
private clubs would be less objectionable if it worked to end invidi-
ous discrimination. Too many of these legal actions, however, are
harassing, frivolous, and do nothing to advance civil rights. The
integration of the YWCA, the Woman's National Democratic Club,
and the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) is a pyrrhic victory for those
desiring to abolish the stigma of exclusion. The practical advance-
ment for the excluded groups is equally hollow-the goods and ser-
vices uniquely available to men joining the YWCA does not sensi-
bly justify the abridgement of the YWCA's right to choose its
members.
More important, integration achieved through the threat of liti-
gation may also work to deny a private club its constitutional
rights. The impracticality of defending a constitutional right in
court does not diminish the importance of the right, or the impor-
tance of the denial of the right. Yet some private groups are un-
justly forced to relinquish their constitutional right to freedom of
association.
The application of the Jaycees test to the BSA demonstrates
that this problem is not conjecture. 12 9 State courts have forced the
BSA to change its longstanding policy and, thus, its character. The
following hypothetical demonstrates that the BSA deserves protec-
tion from state encroachment on its membership practices. 130
129. Several individuals have challenged the exclusionary practices of the BSA. See Cur-
ran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984) (excluding a homosexual from
becoming an adult leader); Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Commission
on Human Rights & Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987) (excluding a woman
from becoming scoutmaster). See also They're All Good Scouts, L.A. Times, Feb. 19, 1988,
at 2-6, col. 1; Boy Scouts' About-Face Is Hailed as a Step Forward, L.A. Times, Feb. 14,
1988, at 1-2, col. 1; Scout mom sues over male-only policy, U.P.I. Regional News, Oct. 5,
1987.
130. But see Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d
352 (1987). In response to the BSA's argument that freedom of association protected its
right to exclude certain groups from positions of adult leadership, the court replied:
Although we need not reach those constitutional issues today, we note that
those arguments have little merit in light of the United State Supreme Court's
recent decisions .... In both cases [Jaycees and Rotary] the Supreme Court
held that even if a public accommodation law infringes slightly on the constitu-
tional rights of expressive association, that infringement is justified because
such statutes serve a compelling state interest in eliminating discrimination.
Id. at _, 528 A.2d at 356 n.5 (citations omitted).
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Application of the Jaycees Test to the BSA
Freedom of Intimate Association and the BSA
The Supreme Court in Rotary indicated that groups other than
the family merited constitutional protection under the freedom of
intimate association.113 Unfortunately, the vague "size," "selectiv-
ity," and "purpose" intimacy gauges" 2 the Court promulgated in
Jaycees make application to other groups difficult. Regarding size,
the BSA numbers close to five million worldwide."3 3 Most activity
among the boys is centered, however, around the "Patrol," which is
usually limited to eight boys. 3 4 The "troop," typically comprising
three or four Patrols,'13 5 is headed by a Scoutmaster.' 6 Because of
the size criterion of the Court's test, the strength of a Boy Scout
troop's intimate protection claim remains uncertain. The member-
ship ceiling will always hover at thirty, which is larger than the
smallest Rotary groups. The largest Rotary clubs, on the other
hand, reached more than 900 members.'3 7
Selection to the BSA is based on three prerequisites. A prospec-
tive Scout must (1) be a boy between ages 11 and 17 inclusive,
(2) find a Scout troop, and (3) "understand and intend to live by"
the rules and signs of Scouting.' sS On the one hand, the BSA al-
131. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
133. R. PETERSON, THE BoY SCOUTS: AN AMERIcAN ADVENTURE 221 (1984). This figure in-
cludes all adult members as well as offshoots such as Cub Scouts, Explorer Scouts, and
Webelos. Id.
134. W. HILLCOURT, THE OFFICIAL Boy SCOUT HANDBOOK 12 (9th ed. 1986).
135. Id. at 20.
136. Boy SCOUTS OF AMERICA, THE OFFICIAL SCOUTMASTER HANDBOOK 59 (7th ed. 1986)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK].
137. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987).
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
138. W. HILLCOURT, supra note 134, at 10-11. The rules and signs of Scouting include:
(1) Scout Oath or Promise
On my honor I will do my best
To do my duty to God and my country
and to obey the Scout Law;
To help other people at all times;
To keep myself physically strong,
mentally awake, and morally straight.
Id. at 27.
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most never denies membership to a boy of proper age. Addition-
ally, the BSA rarely ejects boys for failing to intend to live by the
rather well-developed system of ideals. On the other hand, the fact
that the group is built on a shared belief system to which boys
pledge allegiance generates a bond among them." 9 Whether the
BSA's actual selectivity toward its young members would meet the
Jaycees test, then, is unclear.
(2) Scout Law
A Scout Is: Trustworthy. Loyal. Helpful. Friendly.
Courteous. Kind. Obedient. Cheerful. Thrifty.
Brave. Clean. Reverent.
Id. at 31.
(3) Scout Motto
Be Prepared.
Id. at 42.
(4) Scout Slogan
Do a Good Turn Daily.
Id. at 44.
(5) Scout Sign, Scout Salute, and Scout Handclasp
(illustrations and descriptions omitted)
Id. at 46-47.
(6) Scout Badge
(esoteric symbols and discussion omitted)
Id. at 48.
(7) Outdoor Code
As an American, I will do my best to-
Be clean in my outdoor manners.
Be careful with fire.
Be considerate in the outdoors.
and
Be conservation-minded.
Id. at 54.
139. For support of this proposition, see generally sources cited infra note 158 (discussing
bonds among fraternity members).
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How selective the BSA is toward its Scoutmasters is also un-
clear. A central committee made up of adult Scout leaders asks
individuals to volunteer to be Scoutmasters.140 An "old boy" Scout
network that brings qualified individuals to the attention of the
committee probably facilitates this system.
Tangible skills as well as intangible personal qualities are needed
for Scoutmaster competency:
You should develop a good coach-counselor relationship with
each Scout. Every boy in the troop should be able to talk freely
with you. This is being able to express one's real feelings, not
just talking about the weather and ball games.
You should see yourself as a coach and counselor, as well as an
expert in axmanship and tent pitching.42
The BSA acknowledges that, despite an official commitment to
the metaphysical agenda of the program, most boys join Scouting
to go camping and have fun.143 Scoutmasters divide a troop into
Patrols partly on the basis of personal friendship and choices
among the boys. 4 4 Patrol solidarity is strongly encouraged through
the adoption of Patrol names and Patrol calls-for example, a
"Screaming Eagle Patrol" has a corresponding scream. 45 Each Pa-
trol has its own flag,146 emblem, ' 1 boy leader, 148 meetings,' 49 and
camping trips;150 and during troop meetings, the Patrols compete
against each other in various games and contests.' 5' These activi-
ties are highly personal, and the ties they induce are also personal,
as opposed to commercial or professional. Even the uniform, which
140. HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 59-60.
141. Id. The troop committee starts with a list of men connected with the institution
sponsoring the troop, typically churches, civic groups, or fraternal organizations. W. OURS-
LER, THE Boy SCOUT STORY 117 (1955).
142. HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 24.
143. Id. at 160.
144. Id. at 67.
145. W. HILLCOURT, supra note 134, at 12-14.
146. Id. at 14.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 16; HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 44.
149. W. HILLCOURT, supra note 134, at 17; HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 87.
150. W. HILLCOURT, supra note 134, at 17-18; HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 72.
151. HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 86.
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sets the Boy Scout apart from the crowd of "civilian" peers, serves
to strengthen ties.152
The ties of the adult Scoutmaster to the approximately thirty
boys in his charge are probably different in kind and degree from
the ties among the boys themselves. Nevertheless, part of the
Scoutmaster's duty is to become "intimately involved" in both the
camping activities and the "individual boys": "You are friend,
counselor, and inspirational leader to every boy in the troop. The
better you know each individual boy in the troop, the more valua-
ble his Scouting experience will be.' 153
The extent to which others are excluded from important parts of
the troop relationship is unclear.5 4 Apparently, no activity is so
sacrosanct that it is off-limits to nonmembers; for instance, visitors
are allowed to attend troop meetings if they are not disruptive to
the proceedings.155 The Supreme Court has not clarified the mean-
ing of the seclusion inquiry, and comparisons between the Jaycees
and the BSA on this point are difficult. 1 6 The BSA may not have
any formal rules concerning the exclusion of nonmembers from its
camping trips simply because nonmembers are generally not inter-
ested in attending. Anyone may purchase The Official Boy Scout
Handbook, but only those officially registered can purchase the
uniform. 57 As in the military, wearing of the uniform may well
qualify as a critical symbol of the exclusive aspect of the
relationship.
Overall, the relationship between a Scoutmaster and the mem-
bers of his troop exhibits more qualities of constitutionally pro-
tected intimacy than those in the Jaycees, the Rotary Clubs, or the
New York clubs. Based on size, selectivity, seclusion from others,
and congeniality, the Boy Scout troop falls closer to the family end
152. The uniform "shows that you belong .... It also helps build team spirit in your
patrol and your troop." W. HILLCOURT, supra note 134, at 51.
153. HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 20.
154. Other branches of Scouting, including the Explorers and Cub Scouts, allow partici-
pation by women. Only the Boy Scouts exclude women from adult leadership positions. R.
PETERSON, supra note 133, at 200-02.
155. See HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 80.
156. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
157. HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 330.
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of the intimacy spectrum than to the large business organization
end.158
The Court has applied the freedom of intimate association spar-
ingly in the past, however. Constitutionally protected associations
have always involved some sort of sexual or familial link.15 9 Grant-
ing constitutional protection to the BSA under the freedom of inti-
mate association would entail a radical expansion of its applica-
tion. Yet commentators have argued that college fraternities and
eating clubs would receive constitutional protection under an inti-
macy claim; 160 and in many ways fraternities are comparable to the
BSA. ' 61 The actual selectivity of the BSA toward its Scoutmasters
and its exclusion of nonmembers might be decisive in an intimacy
claim.
Freedom of Expressive Association and the BSA
In the first articles of incorporation the BSA filed in 1910, the
stated purpose of the organization was "to promote, through or-
ganization, and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys
to do things for themselves and others, to train them in Scoutcraft,
and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred
virtues, using the methods which are in common use by Boy
Scouts. 1 62
From the very beginning the self-proclaimed purpose of the BSA
has been more than simply tying knots and pitching tents, al-
though these too are a part.1 63 Rather, the BSA seeks to inculcate
virtue into the lives of young boys through the media of Scouting
rules and activities.6 In the explication of the "Scout Oath ' 65 in
The Official Boy Scout Handbook, the BSA claims that the Scout
law:
158. For a similar argument concerning college fraternities, see Rumsey, supra note 28, at
477-78; Note, Freedom of Association: The Attack on Single-Sex College Social Organiza-
tions, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 426, 433-36 (1986).
159. But see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
160. Rumsey, supra note 28, at 478; Note, supra note 158, at 434.
161. Both are small locally and large nationally; both practice gender exclusion "for its
own sake."
162. R. PETERSON, supra note 133, at 32.
163. W. HILLCOURT, supra note 134, at 9.
164. Id.
165. See supra note 138.
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fits you as a boy. It will fit you just as well when you become a
man-for a real man is everything the Scout Law stands for.
You owe it to yourself, your country, and your God to develop
your body, to train your mind, to strive to be a boy and man of
high character.
... By taking part enthusiastically in all activities of patrol
and troop, by learning the skills that Scouting has to offer, by
living up to the ideals of Scouting, you will become the man you
want to be. 6 6
The underlying didactic thrust of the BSA is stated simply in
The Official Scoutmaster Handbook: "The purpose of the Boy
Scouts of America is to help boys become honorable men.'16 7 One
literary critic and historian has said of The Official Boy Scout
Handbook:
this handbook is among the the [sic] very few remaining popular
repositories of something like classical ethics, deriving from Ar-
istotle and Cicero.... The constant moral theme is the inesti-
mable benefits of looking objectively outward and losing con-
sciousness of self in the work to be done ....
.. In the current world of Making It and Getting Away with
It, there are not many books devoted to associating happiness
with virtue.16 8
The Official Scoutmaster Handbook proclaims that "[e]very Boy
Scout activity and design strives toward the three aims of Boy
Scouting: (1) building character, (2) fostering citizenship, and
(3) developing mental, moral, and physical fitness.' 1 69
The proliferation of the ideals of Boy Scouting, which contain
doctrinaire elements of the civic/political,170 the ethical,' 7 ' and the
religious, 17 2 and their expression in the BSA's activities, is pro-
166. W. HILLCOURT, supra note 134, at 491.
167. HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 98.
168. P. FUSSELL, THE Boy SCOUT HANDBOOK AND OTHER OBSERVATIONS 6-7 (1982).
169. HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 99.
170. See W. HILLCOURT, supra note 134, at 37, 395-449.
171. Id. at 27-44, 54-59, 514-26.
172. Id. at 41, 492.
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tected under the first amendment." 3 Justice O'Connor recognized
this possibility in Jaycees: "Even the training of outdoor survival
skills or participation in community service might become expres-
sive when the activity is intended to develop good morals, rever-
ence, patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement." 174
The Official Scoutmaster Handbook outlines eight "methods,"' 5
terms of art that are "essential to the success of the program.1"176
One of the eight methods is the teaching of the "Ideals" of Scout-
ing-the Scout Oath, Law, Motto and Slogan-which "all matters
of conduct are measured against.' ' 7 7 A second essential method is
"Adult Male Association."' 78 The Official Scoutmaster Handbook
explains the importance of adult male association:
Boys learn from the example of their adult leaders. In his
quest for manhood, every boy needs contact with men he can
copy. The Scoutmaster and his assistants provide a masculine
image of the Boy Scout program. Providing good examples of
manhood is one of the methods of Scouting.
Boys tend to copy whatever models are available to them, and
some may not be really good models. As Scoutmaster, you pro-
vide an example of what a man should be like. Your role as a
friend, coach, and leader to Scouts is a most important part of
Scouting.17 1
The Scoutmaster is a critical component in the transmission of
the BSA's constitutionally protected expression. "The Scoutmaster
is the key to good scouting. The troop is molded in his image."' 180
173. In its discussion of first amendment protection of the Jaycees, the Court acknowl-
edged that the Jaycees do engage in constitutionally protected activity. "[T]he Jaycees regu-
larly engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities wor-
thy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment...." Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626-27 (1984).
174. Id. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Actually, Justice O'Connor compared the Boy
Scouts to the relatively "easy" case of the Jaycees, which O'Connor described as predomi-
nantly commercial and hence undeserving of first amendment protection. Id. at 638-40.
O'Connor's implicit textual reference to the Boy Scouts is made clear in a footnote. Id. at
636 n.*. See Linder, supra note 10, at 1899 & n.104.
175. HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 104-08.
176. Id. at 109.
177. Id. at 104.
178. Id. at 107.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 18.
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One qualification for becoming a Scoutmaster is a "lifetime of ex-
perience" that the Scoutmaster brings to the role. The Official
Scoutmaster Handbook notes that "[y]ou have been a boy, and if
you remember what it was like, you will understand boys bet-
ter."181 Women, by definition, cannot fulfill this qualification for
Scoutmaster. The exclusion of women, based on this factor, is not
arbitrary.
The Supreme Court decided in Jaycees that freedom of expres-
sive association was abridged when a group's message was altered
or diluted by the forced inclusion of another group.'82 The BSA
considers the adult male association the Scoutmaster provides to
be crucial to the program's success. Adult male association would
be diluted by the inclusion of women Scoutmasters. Similarly, the
reduction in gender-specific shared experiences would diminish the
Scoutmaster's effectiveness. The BSA's constitutionally protected
expression would consequently be altered or diluted by the forced
inclusion of women Scoutmasters.
Additionally, the BSA considers adherence to its ideals by both
the Scouts and the Scoutmaster crucial to its success.8 3 For exam-
ple, in its explication of the last phrase of the Boy Scout Oath,
"Morally Straight," The Official Boy Scout Handbook advises that
"[w]hen you live up to the trust of fatherhood your sex life will fit
into God's wonderful plan of creation. Fuller understanding of
wholesome sex behavior can bring you lifelong happiness."'8 4
The oblique reference to "wholesome sex behavior" in The Offi-
cial Boy Scout Handbook is explained more fully in The Official
Scoutmaster Handbook. Within the section "Sex Curiosity," which
is a part of The Official Scoutmaster Handbook called "Individual
Behavior Problems,"'85 the BSA states that:
Incidents of sexual experimentation that may occur in the
troop could run from the innocent to the scandalous. They call
for a private and thorough investigation, and frank discussion
with those involved. It is important to distinguish between
181. Id. at 15.
182. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
183. HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 104.
184. W. HILLCOURT, supra note 134, at 526.
185. HANDBOOK, supra note 136, at 126.
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youthful acts of innocence, and the practices of a homosexual
who may be using his Scouting association to make contacts. A
boy of 15 or so cannot be assumed to be acting out of innocence.
Assist him in securing professional help.186
The Scoutmaster is charged with the duty of discouraging homo-
sexual conduct among his Scouts, such conduct being unwholesome
sexual behavior. To be an avowed homosexual is to assert that a
homosexual lifestyle is a political and moral right.187 This stance is
antithetical to the ideals of Scouting and to the role of the Scout-
master. The forced inclusion of an avowedly homosexual leader
would alter or dilute the constitutionally protected expression of
the BSA. Consequently, the BSA could meet the second prong of
the Jaycees freedom of association test.
The BSA and Public Accommodations Acts: Balancing Freedom
Against Equality
Assuming that the expressive association protects the BSA, the
protection must still be balanced against the state's interest in
eradicating invidious discrimination. In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,' s the Supreme Court held that Minnesota had a compel-
ling interest in assuring equal access to the goods and services the
Jaycees provided."8 9 Specifically, the Court listed leadership skills,
business contacts, and employment promotions as intangible goods
denied to women by the discriminatory practices of the Jaycees. 190
Some commentators argue that mere denial of goods and ser-
vices by private organizations may not always constitute a compel-
ling state interest.'9 ' Under the Jaycees balancing test, unless the
loss to the excluded group is significant, the state's interest may
not be compelling.192
186. Id. at 134.
187. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 723-
24, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 332 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
188. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
189. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
190. 468 U.S. at 626.
191. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 10, at 1887; Marshall, supra note 1, at 93.
192. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 93.
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The probability of judicial protection of private discrimination,
as well as the improbability of state regulation, increases . . .
primarily because the public consequences of the private dis-
crimination become ever more attenuated. The decision of the
Elm Street Saturday Night Poker Club not to admit black mem-
bers, although perhaps morally reprehensible, hardly threatens
significant state interests.193
Two types of association trigger a compelling state interest by
their exclusionary practices: 94 (1) entities that "traditionally have
served as a forum for professional interaction,"'95 such as the
Jaycees, the Rotary Clubs, and private urban men's clubs and
(2) "prestigious country clubs and other social organizations,"196
not only because of the business contacts provided but because of
their value as indicators of professional and social status. 1'
For example, in Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy
Scouts,9 the plaintiff claimed that the BSA provides "considera-
ble financial value to its members in admission to institutions of
higher learning, in employment, and in advancement in the busi-
ness world." 99 Although business deals and "networking" may oc-
cur during Boy Scout Jamborees, no one could seriously maintain
that the goods and services the BSA provided even remotely re-
semble those found in Rotary Club meetings or a Bohemian Club
retreat.0 0 Such an argument becomes reductio ad absurdum:
"Even a bridge club in which little is related other than tasteless
jokes may occasionally spawn a business arrangement. Yet, as this
193. Linder, supra note 10, at 1887.
194. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 94. For a discussion of analytical problems in the
Jaycees compelling state interest test, see Linder, supra note 10, at 1890-91.
195. Marshall, supra note 1, at 94.
196. Id.
197. Id. Memberships in private urban men's clubs may also act as proof of status. For
discussion of the intangible goods and services provided by all-male clubs, see generally
Burns, supra note 85, at 325-43; Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REv.
106, 120-21 (1985); Note, Private Social Clubs, supra note 10, at 1186-90; Note, supra note
28, at 417-20.
198. 147 Cal. App. 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
199. Id. at 718, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
200. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 85, at 334-43 (discussing San Francisco's Bohemian Club
as a gathering place of the rich and powerful).
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example illustrates, it surely overstates the equal access interest to
characterize it as compelling with respect to every organization."2"1
The Supreme Court also found a compelling state interest in
preventing the "stigmatizing injury" that results from exclusion
based on "archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative
needs and capacities of the sexes. ' 20 2 Like the denial of goods and
services, the stigma exclusionary practices create varies according
to the circumstances. 0 3 Not every exclusion is pejorative, and the
Court has found no stigmatizing injury in cases of nonpejorative
exclusion.20 4 Further, not every pejorative exclusion creates a stig-
matizing injury strong enough to trigger a compelling state inter-
est; otherwise, a reductio ad absurdum situation would again re-
sult. The seriousness of the stigma is subjective and may depend
on which side of the fence one is standing.0 5
201. Marshall, supra note 1, at 93.
202. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
203. Marshall, supra note 1, at 94-99.
204. Id. Marshall cites as an example of nonpejorative, nonstigmatic exclusion the case of
United Jewish Orgs. v. Casey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). That decision allowed legislative gerry-
mandering for the purpose of benefitting blacks; the Court found no stigmatic injury to
whites. Marshall, supra note 1, at 95 n.160. Apparently, when the excluded party is in a
position of "strength" vis-a-vis the excluding party, no stigma attaches to the exclusion.
"Such an exclusion," Marshall says, "may be perceived as simply neutral or irrelevant to the
excluded group." Id. at 95. Likewise, Deborah Rhode notes that:
separation imposed by empowered groups carries different symbolic and prac-
tical significance than separation chosen by subordinate groups. Given this na-
tion's historic traditions and cultural understandings, the exclusion of men
from women's liberation groups or garden clubs no more conveys inferiority
than the exclusion of whites from black associations or Protestants from Jew-
ish social organizations. Nor does such exclusivity serve to perpetuate existing
disparities in political or economic power.
Rhode, supra note 197, at 122. But see note 205 infra for the contention that discrimination
against men is harmful to both sexes.
205. Marshall, supra note 1, at 94-99. The academic community does not enjoy unanimity
on this issue, at least with regard to pejorative gender exclusion. See Note, supra note 105,
at 1620-21. One possible method of avoiding the problem of proving damages in sexual dis-
crimination claims is to treat arbitrary sex discrimination as "per se injurious"; it reinforces
harmful stereotypes, damaging the victim as well as the state and the general public. Id. at
1621. Under this view, the state's interest alone is sufficient injury; particular injury to the
claimant is unnecessary. Any exclusion based on gender is pejorative, including, for exam-
ple, lower drink prices for women on "Ladies Night" in bars. The price differential would
"foster[] outdated notions of sexual inequality," which are "harmful to both men and
women." Id. Deborah Rhode argues that sex discrimination works a symbolic "deprivation
of personal dignity." The stigmatizing injury is not so. much to the individual but to the
gender as such in society: "Relegating females to separate dining rooms, separate entrances,
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The stigmatizing injury to homosexuals denied leadership posi-
tions in the BSA is significant. The exclusion is based exactly on
the "archaic and overbroad assumptions" that the Court is at-
tempting to dispel. In this case, the BSA assumes that homosexu-
als lack moral fitness.210 However, this assumption may draw sup-
port from Bowers v. Hardwick,20 7 which the Court decided two
years after Jaycees. The Court's zeal in eradicating stigmatizing
injury to historically disadvantaged groups appears to stop short of
protecting homosexual conduct.20 ' The BSA's assumption regard-
ing the moral fitness of homosexuals rests on firm constitutional
grounds, at least for the present.
The Court considers the prevention of stigmatizing injury to
women to be a compelling state interest.209 Arguably, the exclusion
of women from leadership positions in the BSA, however, does not
work as great an injury toward women as it does homosexuals. The
exclusion of a black male, or a handicapped male, or a homosexual
male from the BSA creates a stigmatizing injury. No one would
think less of a woman, however, because of her exclusion from the
BSA.21 0 The exclusion of women from the BSA is not based on
pejorative assumptions regarding a woman's fitness, as it would
with a black, handicapped, or homosexual male. The exclusion is
based on the alleged benefits of occasional exclusive associations
with one's own gender,21' a concept that mainstream America
would not necessarily construe as pejorative.212
or separate organizations is an affront to individual integrity and self-worth .... [T]hese
symbols of inferiority, once perceived and internalized as such, often can become self-per-
petuating." Rhode, supra note 197, at 121-22. Rhode's argument leaves little room for a
pejorative gender-based exclusion of women that does not raise a compelling state interest.
For further discussion of this issue, see Burns, supra note 85, at 332-34; Marshall, supra
note 1, at 97-99.
206. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
207. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Supreme Court compared private adult consensual sodomy
to adultery and incest. Id. at 195-96.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of nonstigmatizing exclusions, see supra note 204 and accompanying
text.
211. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
212. The Court gave great weight to the opinion of mainstream America on pejorative
assumptions in Hardwick. 478 U.S. at 192-94.
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The BSA should receive greater protection from the freedom of
expressive association than from intimate association. The BSA is
more expressive than the Jaycees or Rotary Clubs, the nexus be-
tween the message and the exclusionary practice is stronger, and
the state interest in integrating the BSA is weaker.2 13 One com-
mentator, in fact, named the Girl Scouts as an organization to
which the application of state PAA's "plainly could not command
the support of a majority on the Court. ' 214 At least one member of
the Court would not uphold the validity of a state PAA applied to
the BSA.21 Clearly, then, the BSA has at least an arguable chance
of prevailing under the freedom of expressive association.2 6
A PosSIBLE SOLUTION
To avoid harassing litigation and infringement on the constitu-
tional rights of protected groups, state and local legislatures need
to draft the definition of public accommodation as precisely as pos-
sible. The legislature must first have an idea of what type of organ-
ization it seeks to integrate through its PAA. Second, the legisla-
ture must somehow convey that idea to judges, to discriminatory
organizations, and to the excluded.
From a policy standpoint, exactly which groups should be the
targets of PAA's is not an easy issue to resolve.2 17 No less difficult,
perhaps, is the task of identifying groups that are deserving of pro-
tection under the Jaycees test without having to apply a fact-spe-
cific inquiry to every discriminatory group in the Nation. Yet both
categories of line drawing-distinguishing groups that are targets
of policy and distinguishing groups that are deserving of constitu-
tional protection-need to be reflected, to a degree useful for
judges and affected parties, in every state and local PAA.
213. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
214. Linder, supra note 10, at 1891.
215. Justice O'Connor would not apply the state PAA to the BSA. See supra note 174
and accompanying text.
216. But cf. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 108-10. Easterbrook asserts that the first
amendment "probably does fall short of protecting the associational freedom of the Jaycees
(or the Boy Scouts or the Boys' Clubs), at least if the Court's characterization of the
Jaycee's activities is accurate." Easterbrook does believe, however, that his Lockean natural
rights approach to the Constitution would grant a "plausible" claim of protection to the
Jaycees, the BSA, and the Boys' Clubs. Id. at 109-10.
217. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
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A clear and express statement of purpose21s and a qualified-list
definition of public accommodation219 are both useful guides for
judges and affected parties. These two methods are not exhaustive,
however, of successful line drawing techniques legislatures use.
The PAA at issue in New York State Club Association v. City of
New York 220 is an example of a well-drafted, creative response to
specifically identified problems. 21 The amendment to Local Law
63222 has a lengthy, express statement of purpose: to advance the
"business, professional and employment opportunities
223  of
women and minorities by prohibiting discrimination in groups
"where business deals are often made and personal contacts valua-
ble for business purposes, employment and professional advance-
ment are formed. 2 24 To that end, the City of New York drafted an
amendment to its definition of public accommodation that prohib-
its discrimination in clubs possessing certain quantitative charac-
teristics: more than 400 members, regular meal service, and regular
receipt of admission payments by nonmembers.225 The statute of-
fers an exemption from this three-prong test to benevolent orders
and religious corporations, such as the Catholic War Veterans, the
Loyal Order of Moose, and the Knights of Columbus. 2 26 These
groups are exempted because the legislature did not find that busi-
ness activity was prevalent among them.227
218. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
220. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
221. The O'Connor concurrence, in which Justice Kennedy joined, praised Local Law 63
for remaining sensitive to the constitutional issues at stake. The administrative proceedings
involving enforcement of the law against a particular group provide a forum for freedom of
association claims. Moreover, state courts have suggested that the three prongs of Local Law
63 are to be applied in concert with the Jaycees test. Id. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See infra note 228.
222. See supra note 79.
223. 108 S. Ct. at 2230.
224. Id.
225. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102-(9) (1986).
226. NEW YORK, N.Y., LocAL LAW No. 63 § 1, app. 15.
227. 108 S. Ct. at 2238 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In oral argument before the Court,
Justice Scalia asked counsel for New York City to justify the exemption. One observer de-
scribed corporation counsel's response:
[T]he City Council had aimed the law only at those private groups at the core
of the problem: clubs serving as business institutions, yet keeping out women
and minorities with "a very negative impact on the economic lives of those
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New York City's law is a successful attempt to announce a clear
policy goal and to draft responsive, bright-line measures imple-
menting that goal. The law effectively lessens the chance of its
misuse in harassing or frivolous lawsuits because both discrimina-
tory groups and excluded parties can clearly understand the basis
for the cause of action under the statute. Either a club has regular
meal service or it does not; either it is the Knights of Columbus or
it is not. Further, the New York City law gives a tacit nod to free-
dom of association by framing its policy goal in terms of commer-
cial and business organizations and by specifically exempting orga-
nizations with an arguable claim to freedom of association. Groups
such as the BSA are protected unless the state law is unclear, un-
settled, or insensitive to freedom of association.228
In contrast to New York City's law stands the California Unruh
Act, the basis for the action in Rotary.229 Called "the most broadly
interpreted general definition of public accommodations, '230 the
Unruh Act has no express statement of purpose, 23 1 no express defi-
nition of public accommodation,232 and unlike California's Housing
excluded." The clubs the law covered were the only ones the city wanted to
reach .... not "the Supreme Council of the Mystic Order of the Veiled
Prophets of the Realm, or a local camp of the Modern Woodsmen of America."
Denniston, Long-Shot Strategy In Private Club Battle, AM. LAW., May, 1988, at 119. New
York City's legislature thus declined to target nonpejorative exclusions, or exclusions that
work such little damage that they raise no compelling state interest. See supra notes 204-05
and accompanying text. Perhaps, too, the legislature was thinking about freedom of
association.
228. Other commentators have praised Local Law 63 as well. Prior to the Supreme
Court's review of the law, one author wrote that Local Law 63 is "specific enough to denote
those organizations within its scope, while simultaneously retaining sufficient flexibility to
assuage concerns as to the associational freedoms of groups that are distinctly private."
Note, Private Club Membership - Where Does Privacy End and Discrimination Begin?, 61
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 474, 499 (1987). Another author wrote that "[t]he three prongs of Local
Law 63 close the gap in anti-discrimination laws whereby so-called 'private clubs' have been
allowed to engage in invidious discrimination, and adequately address the legitimate First
Amendment claims of truly private groups." McGovern, supra note 23, at 142.
229. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1982). See supra note 71. The Act reads in pertinent part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever." Id.
230. Note, supra note 3, at 242.
231. Note, supra note 105, at 1617.
232. See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
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and Employment Acts, the Unruh Act contains no exemptions.233
Judges construe the Unruh Act 34 from the uniquely broad lan-
guage2 35 of the statute.
One commentator wrote approvingly that
[t]he United States Supreme Court in Rotary International spe-
cifically held that application of the Unruh Act to a nonprofit
service organization does not violate the first amendment.
Therefore, the expansive phrase utilized by the California legis-
lature is a legitimate and functional definition of a place in
which antidiscrimination policy may operate.2 36
To the contrary, the Supreme Court in Rotary held that the Unruh
Act did not violate Rotary International's right to freedom of asso-
ciation.3 7 The Supreme Court did not say the Unruh Act could not
violate any other group's freedom of association challenge. The
Court said just the opposite: "[W] e have no occasion in this case to
consider the extent to which the First Amendment protects the
right of individuals to associate in the many clubs and other enti-
ties with selective membership that are found throughout the
country. 2 s3 The Unruh Act trumped only the constitutional claim
of Rotary International; this holding is not an endorsement of the
Unruh Act's universal competency as a PAA.
The Unruh Act does not, in fact, provide a "legitimate and func-
tional definition" of public accommodations. Indeed, the Unruh
Act provides no definition; the legislature surrendered the job of
carving out a definition to judges and to the adversary system. Ad-
ditionally, the Unruh Act provides no specific guidance, no specific
policy goal, and ignores entirely any freedom of association issues
that might arise. Freedom of association, like the definition of pub-
lic accommodation, is left to the state courts and to the affected
233. Note, Rotary International v. Duarte, supra note 74, at 414.
234. Note, supra note 105, at 1617.
235. Note, Rotary International v. Duarte, supra note 74, at 424.
236. Id. Another commentator concurs that the Rotary decision gave a general "stamp of
approval" to broader definitions of public accommodations. McGovern, supra note 23, at
139.
237. 481 U.S. 537, 544-49 (1987). See supra note 71.
238. Id. at 547 n.6.
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parties to infer.239 No organization is alerted to its possible inclu-
sion by the vague language of the statute, so any exclusionary or-
ganization is a candidate for a lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
If the constitutional right to freedom of association protects the
BSA, courts in California and Connecticut240 denied its rights.
Moreover, the financially coerced decision to integrate nationally
was premature. From one standpoint, this result does not matter.
The BSA is not the NAACP, nor is it a nuclear family; and the
abridgment of its associational freedom does not elicit the popular
constitutional outrage involved in those cases. Further, the constit-
uency of the BSA will probably not change greatly as a result of its
legal defeats and its decision to integrate. Yet, as Douglas Linder
wrote:
When the last all-women's private school is forced to close its
doors, when the law no longer tolerates the existence of all-Nor-
wegian or all-Catholic clubs, when the Boy Scouts and the Girl
Scouts finally merge, even those of us calling ourselves egalitari-
ans may stop to shed a tear or two for pluralism lost.241
The forced integration of the BSA matters precisely because the
integration of the BSA is trivial. Such a decision neither advances
the political or moral rights of the formerly excluded, nor upholds
the important goals of antidiscrimination legislation.
Paul Varela
239. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 147 Cal. App. 3d
712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
240. See supra note 129.
241. Linder, supra note 10, at 1902.
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